ABSTRACT Certificateless public key cryptosystem (CLPKC) is a desirable cryptographic system because it refrains from both certificate management and key escrow. In CLPKC, how to revoke a misbehaving or compromised user is an important issue. However, the existing revocable methods in CLPKC are impractical because of the use of either an expensive mediator or a burdensome key generation center (KGC). In order to overcome this drawback, we introduce outsourcing computation into CLPKC for the first time and design an outsourced revocable certificateless signature (ORCLS) scheme, and the revocation functionality is outsourced to a cloud server. The amount of computation needed to revoke a user is borne by the cloud server, which greatly reduces the burden on the KGC. In the rest of this paper, we formalize the definition and the security model for an ORCLS scheme and construct the first ORCLS scheme without bilinear pairings. It is proved that our scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks from Type I, Type II, Type III, and Type IV adversaries under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Moreover, our scheme needs less computational cost and communication overhead and thus is more efficient than the other proposed revocable certificateless signature schemes so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) was introduced by Shamir [1] in 1984. It is a good alternative for traditional PKC which requires high maintenance cost for certificate management. However, ID-PKC is easy to suffer from the private key escrow. To avoid this drawback, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] introduced the certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) in 2003. The CLPKC combines the advantages of ID-PKC and traditional PKC because it has no key escrow and at the same time alleviates the certificate management. At present, a large number of encryption and signature schemes are proposed in CLPKC. We refer readers to works [3] - [8] .
In a public key cryptosystem, an vital issue is how to revoke a user when his/her private key is leaked or the permission is expired. In traditional PKC, there exist some ripe revocation methods, such as Certificate Revocation List (CRL), online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [9] and a revocation technique proposed by Novomodo [10] . In ID-PKC and CLPKC, the initial revocation technique is that the KGC periodically updates the (partial) private key for the user. However, each new key must be transmitted to the user through a secret channel. And the establishment of secret channel requires a lot of calculations by the system and the users, which greatly increases the communication overhead. Therefore, it is better to use public channels instead of secret channels when designing a revocation scheme. As matters stand, many revocation schemes with public channels have been proposed in ID-PKC. In 2008, Boldyreva et al. [11] presented an ID-based encryption scheme with efficient revocation. In 2012, Tseng and Tsai [12] and Tsai et al. [13] constructed a revocable ID-based encryption scheme and a revocable ID-based signature scheme with batch verifications. In 2013, Seo and Emura [14] proposed a revocable ID-based encryption scheme against decryption exposure. Recently, Li et al. [15] put forward a revocable ID-based encryption scheme with cloud server, and Jia et al. [16] also proposed a revocable ID-based signature scheme using the revocation method in [15] .
Techniques for revoking users in CLPKC can be found in literatures [2] , [17] - [26] . Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] provided an initial revocation technique which the KGC refreshes the partial private keys for all non-revoked users via secure channels, which inevitably leads to more computations. Ju et al. [17] used the online and semi-trusted Security Mediator (SEM) to realize the revocation of the user key. In 2007, Yap et al. [18] utilized SEM to revoke a user. SEM retains the partial private key generated by KGC, and the user realizes decrypting or signing operations through the partial private keys retained by SEM. When the user needs to be revoked, SEM stops decrypting or signing services. However, SEM stores a great deal of secret information from the user, which increases potential safety hazard of the system. Moreover, the user can not decrypt or sign independently.
In 2014, Shen et al. [19] put forward a new revocation method in CLPKC. That is, KGC generates a partial private key and a time key for a user, and periodically updates the time key of the non-revoked user. If a user needs to be revoked, KGC just stops updating the user's time key. With this revocation method, Shen et al. [19] proposed a revocable certificateless encryption scheme with public channels in the standard model. However, Tang et al. [20] pointed out Shen et al. ' s encryption scheme has security vulnerability. Tsai et al. [21] and Zhang and Zhao [22] put forward a certificateless signature scheme with revocation in the standard model, respectively. However, each scheme is relatively inefficient since seven expensive bilinear pairings are employed in the verification algorithm. Sun et al. [23] , [24] presented two revocable certificateless signature scheme in the random oracle model with bilinear pairings. In 2016, Hung et al. [25] constructed a revocable certificateless short signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. And the size of signature is only one group element. Sun et al. [26] presented an efficient revocable certificateless signature (RCLS) scheme without using expensive bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, according to the attack methods in [27] , Sun et al.'s scheme is insecure against the Type I and Type II adversaries.
Moreover, the revocation method used in above schemes [19] - [26] has two shortcomings. Firstly, the KGC must always be online, which is more easily attacked by the adversaries. Secondly, the burden on the KGC also increases drastically along with the number of users increases. Thus, the KGC has become the bottleneck of scheme implementation.
CONTRIBUTIONS:
This paper studies how to revoke a user in CLPKC. We introduce outsourcing computation proposed by Li et al. [15] into CLPKC for the first time and design an outsourced revocable certificateless signature scheme (ORCLS). In our method, KGC sends a time master key to a cloud server (CS), the CS generates a time key for a user based on the user revocation list received from the KGC, and then sends the time key to the user via a public key channel. If the user is already in the user revocation list, the CS refuses to update the time key for the user. Without the time key, the user cannot correctly do any decrypting or signing. Thus, the user can be revoked. The revocation functionality is outsourced to the CS. As a result, the amount of computation needed to revoke a user is borne by the CS, which greatly reduces the burden on KGC.
Then, we formalize the definition and the security model for an ORCLS scheme. And then we put forward the first ORCLS scheme without bilinear pairings. It is proved that our scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks from Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV adversaries under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) assumption. Moreover, our scheme needs less computational cost and has better performance than other existing revocable certificateless signature schemes.
II. THE DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL FOR ORCLS SCHEME A. ELLIPTIC CURVE AND COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 1) ELLIPTIC CURVE
Assume that the notation F p denotes a prime finite field, which p is a prime number, and the symbol E/F p denotes an elliptic curve E over F p is defined by an equation:
, where a, b ∈ F p and (4a 3 + 27b 2 ) mod p = 0. Let the point at infinity be o. The points on E/F p and o form an elliptic curve additive group G under the operation of point addition R = P + Q for P, Q ∈ G defined according to a chord-and-tangent rule. Let the order of group G be q, and P is a generator of G. We define lP = P + P + · · · + P(l times, l ∈ Z q ) as an elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
2) COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
-Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problemis defined as follows:
Let G denote an elliptic curve additive group with prime order q, and P is a generator of G. Given a random instance Q ∈ G, where Q = xP and x ∈ Z * q , it is computational infeasible to calculate x from Q.
Up to now, the ECDL problem is intractable in polynomial time.
B. DEFINITION OF ORCLS
An ORCLS scheme includes three entities: the KGC, the CS and the users (signer and verifier). At the start of the system, the KGC produces and publishes the system parameters, and then sends a time master key to a CS by a secure channel. Next, the KGC secretly sends the partial private key to a registered user. The CS generates the time key for the user based on the user revocation list received from the KGC and sends it to the user by a public channel. The user's time key is a short-term key related to the current time period. If a user needs to be revoked, KGC only notifies the CS to stop issuing new time key for the user. We propose the framework of our ORCLS scheme and illustrate the relationships among the participating entities in Figure 1 .
Definition 1: An ORCLS scheme is specified by the following six algorithms:
-Setup is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm, run by the KGC. Taking a security parameter l as input, the algorithm returns a system master key s , a time master key ts, and a public parameters params. Then, ts is sent to the CS in a secure way.
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract is a PPT algorithm, run by the KGC. It takes params, a user's identity ID, and the master key s as inputs, and returns the user's partial private key d ID .
-Time-Key-Update is a PPT algorithm, run by the CS. When receiving an update request from a user with identity ID, the CS checks whether the user ID is in the user revocation list or not. If not, the CS takes params, ts, ID, a time period T i as inputs and returns a new time key d IDTi for the user. After the end of the period T i , d IDTi is invalid.
-User-Key-Generate is a PPT algorithm, run by a user with identity ID. It takes as inputs params and the user's ID, and outputs the user's secret value x ID and his public key pk ID .
-Sign is a PPT algorithm, run by a user (signer) with identity ID. It takes params, a message m, ID, T i , pk ID , d ID , d IDTi , x ID as inputs, and outputs a signature σ on the message m.
-Verify is a deterministic algorithm, run by a verifier. Taking as inputs params, the signer's identity ID and his public key pk ID , a time period T i , and a message-signature pair (m, σ ), the algorithm returns 1 means the signature is accepted. Otherwise, 0 means rejected.
C. SECURITY MODEL FOR ORCLS
In this section, we present the security model for an ORCLS scheme. There are four types of adversaries with different capabilities which should be considered in this scenario, namely, Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV. Type I Adversary A 1 models a dishonest user. Type II Adversary A 2 acts as a malicious-but-passive KGC. Type III Adversary A 3 simulates a malicious revoked user and Type IV Adversary A 4 acts as a curious CS.
Type I Adversary: Adversary A 1 does not have access to the system master key nor the user partial private key, but A 1 can compromise the user secret value or replace the public key of any user with a value of his choice.
Type II Adversary: Adversary A 2 knows the system master key and the user's partial private key, but cannot obtain the user secret value nor replace the user public key.
Type III Adversary: Suppose adversary A 3 is a malicious revoked user with identity ID, which was revoked at time period T i . A 3 wants to generate a valid signature after T i . We assume that A 3 can obtain the partial private key and the secret value of the user ID, but A 3 cannot get the user ID's time key after T i .
Type IV Adversary: A 4 acts as a curious CS who knows the time master key, and he/she intends to impersonate the system user to forge a valid signature. We suppose that the CS can obtain the partial private keys and the secret values of other users except the target user.
We define a security model for an ORCLS scheme that is implemented through the following four games where A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 interact with their challengers X 1 , X 2 , X 3 and X 4 , respectively .
Game I
The game between the adversary A 1 and the challenger X 1 is defined as follows.
Setup: The challenger X 1 takes as input a security parameter l, and returns a system master key s, a time master key ts, and a system parameters params. X 1 sends params to A 1 and keeps s in secret. And then, ts is transmitted to the CS via a secret channel. Query:Adversary A 1 can adaptively query the following oracles: -Create-User: Upon receiving this query on an identity ID i , X 1 runs the Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm to generate the partial private key d ID i , and runs the User-KeyGenerate algorithm to produce the user's secret value x ID i and his public key pk IDi . Then X 1 stores (
into a list L list , and then returns pk IDi to A 1 .
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: When receiving this query on an identity ID i , X 1 searches the list L list for an corresponding entry to the identity ID i . If the tuple
-Secret-Value-Extract: A 1 can request the secret value of a user with identity ID i and obtain the secret value x ID i .
-Time-Key-Update: A 1 queries this oracle with inputs a user's identity ID i and a time period T i , X 1 runs the TimeKey-Update algorithm and produces a time key d IDTi and returns it to A 1 .
-Public-Key-Replacement: A 1 can replace the user ID i 's public key pk IDi with the new one pk * IDi . -Sign: When receiving this query on a message m i , a time period T i , an identity ID i and the public key pk IDi , X 1 runs the Sign algorithm and produces a signature σ i and returns it to A 1 .
Forgery: Finally, A 1 outputs a tuple (m * , σ * , T * i , ID * i , pk * IDi ) and wins the game if the following conditions hold: -σ * is a valid signature on message m * under an identity ID * i and the corresponding public key pk * IDi and the time period T * i . -The tuple (m * , ID * i , T * i ) has never been submitted to the Sign oracle.
-ID * i has not been submitted to the Partial-Private-KeyExtract oracle.
Game II The game between the adversary A 2 and the challenger X 2 is defined as below.
Setup: The challenger X 2 runs the Setup algorithm in the same way as that in Game I. Additionally, X 2 sends the system master key s to A 2 . Query:Adversary A 2 adaptively queries the following oracles just as those in Game I: Create-User, Secret-Value-Extract, Time-Key-Update, Sign.
Note: The Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracle is no longer needed because A 2 knows the system master key s. 
III. AN EFFICIENT ORCLS SCHEME
A. THE BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we propose an outsourcing revocable certificateless signature(ORCLS) scheme as below.
-Setup: Given a security parameter k, q is a k-bit prime number, KGC performs the following steps:
(1) Produce a group G of elliptic curve points with order q. P is a generator of group G. VOLUME 6, 2018 (2) Choose x, v ∈ Z * q uniformly at random and compute y = xP, y T = vP, and keep x secretly as the system master key. KGC sends v to a cloud server (CS) as the time master key through a secure channel.
(3) Pick four distinct cryptographic hash functions
as the system public parameters.
-User-Key-Gen: For a user with identity ID, the algorithm randomly chooses x ID ∈ Z * q as the user ID's secret value and computes PK ID = x ID P as the public key of the user ID.
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given params and an identity ID, this algorithm chooses a random value r ∈ Z * q and computes
and d ID = r + xh 1 (mod q), and then returns D ID = (w ID , d ID ) as the user ID's partial private key.
-Time-Key-Update: When receiving an update request from a user with identity ID and a time period T i , the CS picks a random value r T ∈ Z * q and computes w IDT = r T P,
Then, the CS sends the time key D IDT = (w IDT , d IDT ) to the user ID by a public channel. The user ID can check the validity of the time key D IDT by calculating whether the equation d IDT P = w IDT + h 2 y T holds or not.
-Sign: Given a message m, a time period T i , a signer's partial private key D ID , the secret value x ID , the time key D IDT and the public key PK ID , the algorithm computes the following:
(1) Randomly pick t ∈ Z * q and compute U = tP;
-Verify: Upon receiving a message-signature pair (m, σ = (U , V , w ID , w IDT )), a time period T i , and the signer ID's public key PK ID , the algorithm computes as follows:
(1) Computes h 1 = H 1 (ID, w ID , P, y, y T ),
Computes
If it holds, the algorithm returns ''accept'', otherwise returns ''reject''.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we will prove that our ORCLS scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks from four Types of adversaries. Theorem 1: If A 1 is a polynomial-time adversary who can break our ORCLS scheme with a non-negligible advantage ε after making at most q 1 queries to the random oracle H 1 and q e queries to the Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracle, then we can establish an algorithm X 1 that uses A 1 as a black box to solve the ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ ε ((q 1 − 1)/q 1 ) q e /q 1 .
Proof: Let (P, aP) ∈ G be a random instance of the ECDL problem. X 1 's goal is to obtain the solution a of the ECDL instance by interacting with A 1 .
Setup X 1 picks two random values x, v ∈ Z * q and computes y = xP, y T = vP, and generates the system public parameters are: 
Here l * i = l i . From Equation (1), Equation (2), X 1 can
. As a result, X 1 can obtain the value a which is the answer of the challenging ECDL instance.
Now, let's analyze the probability of X 1 's success. X 1 succeeds in this game when the following events E 1 and E 2 do not happen, but event E 3 happens. 
q e /q 1 . Hence, X 1 solves the ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ ε ((q 1 − 1)/q 1 ) q e /q 1 .
Theorem 2:
If A 2 be a polynomial-time adversary who has an advantage ε in breaking our ORCLS scheme after performing at most q 1 queries to the random oracle H 1 and q s queries to the Secret-Value-Extract oracle, then we can construct an algorithm X 2 that can solve the ECDL problem with a probability
Proof: We will show how X 2 can utilize A 2 as a black box to solve a random instance (P, aP) ∈ G of the ECDL problem. Setup X 2 chooses two random values x, v ∈ Z * q and computes y = xP, y T = vP, and generates the system public parameters are:
params : {k, q, G, P, y, y T 
) for an identity ID * i with the public key PK * IDi and a time period T i . If ID * i = ID I , X 2 outputs ''failure'' and aborts. Otherwise, according to the forking lemma [28] , A 2 returns a different signature σ i = (U * i , V i , w IDi * , w IDiT * ) on the same message m * i . Obviously, the following two equations are hold.
Here h * 3i = h 3i . By subtracting Equation (4) from Equation (3), X 2 can obtain the target value a = (
Using the similar method as we used to analyze X 1 's success probability in Theorem 1, we can conclude that X 2 can solve the ECDL problem with a probability
Theorem 3:
If there is a Type III adversary A 3 against our ORCLS scheme with an advantage ε. Then, we can build an algorithm X 3 to solve the ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ ε/q 1 in which q 1 refers to the number of times to query the random oracle H 1 .
Proof: Given a random instance (P, aP) ∈ G of the ECDL problem, X 3 intends to obtain a by interacting with A 3 .
Setup The Setup algorithm is the same as that in Theorem 1. Query -Create-User: when A 3 makes this query on an input an identity ID i , X 3 first chooses a random value x IDi ∈ Z * q and computes PK IDi = x IDi P. Then, X 3 picks two random values r i , h 1i ∈ Z * q , computes w IDi = r i P, sets H 1 (ID i , w IDi , P, y, y T ) = h 1i , and computes d IDi = r i + xh 1i (mod q).
In the above case, we show that the identity ID i has been created. The tuple (w IDi , d IDi ) is the user ID i 's partial private key and x IDi is his secret value. At last, X 3 returns PK IDi to A 3 , and inserts the tuple (
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: A 3 makes a query on a created identity ID i , X 3 recovers the corresponding tuple
-Time-Key-Update: On inputs a created identity ID i and a time period T i , X 3 responds as follows:
If ID i = ID I , X 3 randomly picks t i ∈ Z * q and computes w IDiT = t i P, and randomly chooses h 2i ∈ Z * q , sets H 2 (ID i , T i , w IDiT ) = h 2i , and then computes d IDiT 
In the above two cases, X 3 returns the time key D IDiT = (w IDiT , d IDiT ) to A 3 , and adds this record
TK . -Secret-Value-Extract: Upon receiving such a query for a created identity ID i , X 3 recovers the corresponding tuple
-Public-Key-Replacement: When A 3 makes this query on input (ID i , PK IDi ), X 3 finds the corresponding record 
Here l * i = l i . From Equation (5), Equation (6), X 3 can compute
as the answer to the ECDL problem.
It is easy to see that X 3 can solve the ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ ε/q 1 .
Theorem 4: If there exists a Type IV adversary A 4 against our ORCLS scheme with an advantage ε after making at most q 1 queries to the random oracle H 1 and q s queries to the Secret-Value-Extract oracle. Then, we can build an algorithm X 4 to solve the ECDL problem with a probability
in which q 1 denotes the number of times to query the random oracle H 1 .
Proof: Given a random instance (P, aP) of the ECDL problem, X 4 intends to get the solution a by interacting with A 4 . Setup X 4 picks two random values x, v ∈ Z * q , computes y = xP, y T = vP, the system public parameters are: (7) and (8) are hold.
By subtracting Equation (8) from Equation (7), X 4 can compute
It is easy to see that X 4 can solve the ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ ε/q 1 · 1 −
C. EFFICIENCY
In the computational cost comparison, we apply the same running times for the related cryptographic operations, calculated by applying MIRACL library [29] . The hardware platform is a PIV 3 GHz processor with 512 Mb memory and Windows XP operating system. The running times of the related operations are listed in Table 1 from the literature [30] . Because of the running times of a point addition in G, a multiplication in Z * q and an ordinary hash function are trivial, we omit these operations when we evaluate the performance.
We compare our ORCLS scheme with other existing revocable certificateless signature schemes in terms of computational cost and communicational overhead in Table 2 and  Table 3 (See Appendix A).
For the pairing-based schemes, the Tate pairing based on the supersingular elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + x for p is a 512 bits prime number, which can reach 1024 bits RSA security level. For the ECC-based schemes, to reach the same security level, we employ the ECC group on Koblitz elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b on a finite field F 2 163 which a = 1 and b is a 163 bits random prime number. Let |G pr | and |G ecc | denote the length of a pairing-based group element and a ECC-based group element, respectively. And |Z q * | indicates the length of a group Z q * for q is a 160 bits prime number.
As shown in Table 2 and Table 3 , our scheme has the lowest computational cost compared with the schemes [21] - [ 24] . Our scheme requires a total of 8 elliptic curve scalar multiplication in P-P-K Extract, Time-Key-Update, Sign and Verify algorithms, and the running time is 8×0.83=6.64ms, which is 3.2% of that of scheme [21] , 2.63% of that of scheme [22] , 6 .3% of that of scheme [23] , 4.6% of that of scheme [24] .
From Table 2 and Table 3 , we can see the signature generated by Tsai et al.'s scheme [21] consists of four pairing-based group elements, so the signature length of their scheme is (4×512)/8=256 byte. The length of signature in scheme [22] is 5|G pr |=(5×512)/8=320 byte, and the length of signature in scheme [23] and scheme [24] is 128 byte, respectively. In our scheme, the signature consists of three ECC-based group elements and one group element in Z * q , thus the signature length is about (4×160)/8=80 byte, which is the shortest signature than that of schemes in [21] - [24] . Hence, our scheme is more efficient than these schemes in [21] - [24] because it has the least computational cost and the lowest communication overhead.
IV. CONCLUSION
In certificateless public key cryptosystem, how to revoke a misbehaving or compromised user is an important issue. In this paper, we propose a new and practical outsourced revocable certificateless signature scheme. It is proved that our scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks from Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV adversaries under the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm assumption. In addition, our scheme requires less computational cost and communication overhead, so it is more efficient than other proposed revocable certificateless signature schemes.
APPENDIX
See Tables 2 and 3 
